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TACTICAL PLANNING (OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE) MINIMUM. ESSENTIAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
With the establishment by the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) of the TOS (tactical operations system) User Requirement Committee (TURC) in November 1973, the Army once again underscored the need for Army tactical data systems to be sensitive to the users of those systems. A primary requirement is the determination of the commander's minimum essential information needs (CMEIN) in order to estimate data storage requirements for these systems.
Unfortunately, while the problem of establishing information requirements is easy to state, its solution is most difficult. ARI has recognized this difficulty and has been engaged in a long-term research program to provide suitable methodologies and techniques for dealing with the problem. McKendry, et al 1 developed a survey instrument consisting of 61 unstructured combat events, using a scaling technique previously employed by ARI. 2 McKendry, et al used this instrument to collect information requirements data from staff officers in the U. S. Seventh Army, Europe. One of the findings was that, during pretesting, respondents found it difficult to limit themselves to 30 initial events (as instructed) from the list of 61 events. During actual data collection, subjects were told that an upper limit of 30 was to be used as a guideline only and not as an unbreakable rule. Twenty-one of the 86 officer subjects exceeded the limit.
This finding and a followup study by Mace and Baker 3 suggested the possibility that survey respondents may be inclined to consider everything critical. A later study was conducted by Strub 4 to determine the validity of survey-generated information reouirements. The method consisted of having survey respondent-(sample 1) rate the importance of a set of structured information items from data bases used to support offensive and defensive tactical planning tasks in a simulated tactical operations system (SIMTOS).
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This permitted an importance value to be obtained for each item (importance predictor).
The second step consisted of scoring the number of officers (sample 2) requesting each of these items of information during the course of satisfying certain tactical planning tasks in SIMTOS.
This permitted a consensus value to be obtained for each item (consensus criterion).
Assuming that the most critical information is also the information requested most frequently in a tactical combat operation, it is possible to determine the validity of survey data by comparing the rated importance of the information (predictor) with the number of requests for the information (criterion).
Results from the Strub study tended, in general, to support the hypothesized tendency for survey respondents to reflect a response bias of rating everything critical.
The Strub study, then, suggests the value of using a tactical exercise simulator such as SIMTOS as a means for collecting data relative to actual information needs of che commander and his staff. At present, a paucity exists of analytic and research data concerning specific information requirements of the commander and his staff engaged in the planning and execution of a tactical operation. One report(unpublished)resulted from an ad hoc study group which met at the Combat Developments Command (now TRADOC) Institute of Combined
Arms and Support (ICAS).
The ICAS report represents the resglts of a committee approach to specifying information requirements. 9. Grease' pencils and rag
The experimenter control station contained a CRT and keyboard through which the experimenter logged in subjects ov number, designated whether an offensive or defensive scenario was beinp ulaved, and initialized the subject's access to thl data base.
Thus It was possible fo,. the experimenter to operate with the offensive scenario and defensive scenario on-KiT,e at the same time by designacing a subje-t station a3 offensive or defensive at the expeiimenter CRT.
The computer t'ien sent the tactical information for the aippropriate scenario to .he designated subject station. The experimenter's CRT also allowed him to monitor informatimn being reviewed at a particular subject station.
PROCEDURE
Each subject was briefed concerning the goal of the research, the items of equipment in his facility, his role in the experinent, and the general situation in which the scenario unfolds.
He was also requested to note any information which he wanted but could not find in the data base and to make any comoents or suigestions for Improvements.
Each of the 40 subjects in the offensive scenario was asked to assome the role of the new G3 of an aggressor Combined Arms Army (CAA) within an Army Group (Okcidento) in eastern Europe,
The political situation between east and west has been deteriorating rapidlv. Army Group Okcidento has recently been directed to prepare for an offensive to the west at a date and time yet to be specified. The subject's role as CGA G-was to complete offensive planning to &cccm-piish the CAA mission as specified in Armyv Group Okcidento Operation Order (OPORD) which he was given to read prior to the start of the problem.
His planning se.uence was divided into tw-phases. Tn the first phase, he performed a mission analvsis and recommended P form of maneuver.
During the second phase he developed a task organization and prepared mission directives to his subordinate units.
Each of the 40 subjecLs in the defensive scenario was asked to assume the role of the new G3 of a 17. S, Mechanized Division within a U. S. Corps ,'n alert status in an assembly area in Gernanv.
I'e was given first instructions by excerpts from & Corps OPORD and from guidance issuý'd by the Mech Div Commander.
His job was to prepare a presentation for the Commander's morning briefing. Specific tasks within his defensive planning included developing a course of action, task organization, and mission statevents to subordiaate units.
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•Both otfensive and defensive data bases were similar in structure. During offensive or defensive planniAg activities, each officer was able to obtain tacticai inforimation by weans of his CR? scretan. Stored within the computer was detailed information relevant to all aspects of his problem organized under the following malor c:arogories: The information was arranged in the computer in a manner that enablod the subject to review and select categories and subcuteigories of tactical data to successive levels of detail until a desirei elemeront of information was obtained.
Each displ.:v. appe.tring on the face of the CRT was diviided in half hori--ontally.
The top half of the display consisted of elithezr an information Index or tactical data elements. The ,ottom half consisted of options availatle for the subject's ,at;mcve, as well -is instructions for carrying out the desired retrieval.
Instructional materials used in the offensive scenario (inc uditng procedural Instruct ions, OPORD, and task requirement sheats) are present e(l in Appendix A. A similar set of materials used in the defensive scenario appears in Appendix B.
CRITERION
The structure of the data base permitted measureient of all i'rf.rmation requesrts by category as well as lev'ot detail.
•v•rv information
request made by each officer was recorded by the computer.
UIile the criticality of an information item may be said to vary directly with the number of officers requesting it, no universallv accepted definition of information criticality exists. Therefore two operational definitions were used as criteria to permit a broader interpretation of the results.
The first and stricter criterion for an item to be called critical or essential was a request frequency of 75T or more of the officers within each scenario (i.e., 30 or more).
The second and less strict criterion for an item to be defined as essential was a request frequency of 50% or more of the officers within each scenario (i.e., 20 or more).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Information it,.ms requested by 75% or more of the SlY'TOS subjects for the offensive and defunrive scenarios are presented in Tables I  and 2 , respectively.
It is most interesting to note the strikini, similarity in information requirements despite the tact that the scenarios imposed differenc task requirem_-nts (attack vs. defense planning ) and represented different echelo.as (i.e., the role of aggressor G3 was equivalent to a U. S. Corp!s G3 while the defensive role was that of a Division C3).
As seen in Tables I and 2 , the key areas of concern for the overwhelmine majorltv of officers were enemy situation, task organization, and combat efficiency. These areas emerged from data bases which contained over 1000 items of information each.
The structure of the data base permitted examination of the specific questions of interest within each key area. Tables I  and 2 Tables 3 and 4 , respectively. When the criterion is lowered to 50%, two trends are evident.
First more detailed information concerning the three basic areas of interest identified in Tables I and 2 were requested.
Secondly, the areas of interest are expanded beyond intelligence (G2) and operations (03) elements to include information concerning personnel (61), logistics (G4), civil affairs (05), fire support CFSF) and engineering (EINGR).
The pattern of similarities between scenario requirements at the 75% level persists at the 50% level although more specific Items of information relevant to the offensive or defensive situation begir to emerge.
Interest in the enemy situation has expanded to include units opposing the krmy Groups in the offensive scenario (Table 3) and to include air and NBC warfare knformation in the defensive scenario (Table 4) .
Interest in -emeri capabilities has broadened to include ground support, ground reinforcements, air and attack capabilities in addition to first line ground capabilities.
Tactical asnects have increased from key terrain and avenues of approach to include observation, fields of fire, cover and concealment, and obstacles to movement.
Several new categories of information appear at the 5O0 level. Enemy order of battle information becomes critical in both offensive and defensive scenarios.
Weather, particularly 3-day, precipitation, and fog forecasts, and counterintelligence information are frequently requested in the offensive scenario wl'ile stream fordabilitv for a particular river in the problem (Saale River) and aggressor movement times to the international border are key defensive items. More detailed friendly unit task organization information is deemed necessary at the 50% level. Offensive subjects are interested In the units within each of their divisions as well as their support units.
Defensive subjects check the units within their Fngr Bn, Armd Cay Sqdn, and all Arty groups.
Interest in combat efficiency extends beyond training and personnel status to include morale and health status.
Interest in unit location inform tion appears for the first time at the 50% level in both scenarios. Aggressor offensive doctrine items pertaining to basic forms of maneuver and river crossing operations (Table 3 ) may be specific to the sub'ec:'s role as G3 of foreign forces. At the 50% criterion level, several information recuirements emerge outside of the intelligence.and operations elements. Offensive subjects request CAA authorized personnel strength while defensive subjects ask for the effective percent of their Mech Div. Supply status items appear as the only key items from the G4 logistics element.
A summary of civil affairs is requested in the defensive scenario.
In the FSE element, interest in weapons is expressed in both problems while defensive subjects also desire friendly air support and nuclear allocation information.
No information from the CBRE, signal, or transportation elements was requested freouentlv enough to be considered critical for either scenario.
Within the engineer element offensive subjects desired information on hasty river crossing doctrine while defensive subjects requested mission data.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS -

A
The present experiment has identified minimum essential information requirements for offensive and defensive tactical planning. These requirements were identified as a result of analyzing the infor:mation requests of highly experienced field grade officers who actually accomplished sets of offensive and defensive tasks in a controlled exercise environment.
To this extent,'-the results of this exoerimentshould renresent a close approximation to real world minimum essential information requirements.
However, because the data were gathered in a controlled exercise environment, certain restrictions must be placed on the generalizability of these requirements.
The scenarios presented a single offensive and single defensive set of task requirements for a mechanized corps and mechanized division echelon in a potential mid-intensitv conflict.
The environment is pre-combat and reflects planning activitv only.
In the offensive scenario, each officer assumed the role of G3 in a forelgn Ar-=v.
In this role he might perceive information needs differentlv from those which would pertain were he to perform attack plamnin In the role of a V. S. G3. Finallv,-at the 50% criterion level, certain informatio item which barely attained the mini== request frequency tight drop out were the experiment to be replicated,$ O:her items which !ell iat short of the cutoff !. the 3resen: e3:e~ri-me-n-a .!zh: ache-e sirwnficance, uPon repllcat•on S.one:heless, the minimm esseitiai 1~ro.-at rerur o:s •/enzIf -,e~d to the pr~ese=n ex-erizeet re f Iezt a *_-±v-. of i_-1oz-na: 1 = :errs Cý=-sistentlv re4ues:ed by exn-erienced Ay=Y ofl.lcers. The Behavior and Systems Research Laboratory (BFSRL), an activity of the Chief of Research and Development, is studying tactical decisioi, making behavior. The ultimate goal of the research is to relate command system design to information processing and assimilation, problem solving, and decision making behavicr.
We would like you to help in this effort by taking part in some offensive planning activities today. Since we cannot provide you with a full complement of staff element personnel, an automated data system has been provided as a decision aid.
II. FACILITY ORIENTATION CRT Screen
Map and overlays
Wall Displays
Work At present your unit is in an assembly area of eastern Europc. The political situation between east and west has been deteriorating rapidly. Army Group Okcidento has recently been directed to prepare for an oxffensive to the west at a date and time yet to be specified.
Your role as the 16 CAA G-3 will be to complete offensive planning to accomplish the 16 CAA mission as specified in Army Group Okcidento OPORD #15. The aforementioned planning is to be done employing current aggressor attack doctrine. Assume no contingency plans are available. £f 1CEDNG PAG BLAKI 2. In accomplishing your G-3 activities you have access to tactical information stored in the computer. When you request information it will be displayed on your cathode ray tube (CRT).
3. You will receive initial instructions by means of OPORI #]5 which is on your work table.
Your planning sequence will be divided into two phases, i.e., Form cf Maneuver, and 2perations-Plan Development.
You will be given commander's guidance, specific task requirements, and instructions at the beginning of each phase. At the end of Phase II you will be asked to complete a brief questionnaire.
4. During your planning activities you will be able to obtain tactical information by means of your CRT screen. Stored within the computer is detailed information relevant to all aspects of your problem organized under the major categories listed below: Friendly Forces
G-1 Personnel Element
G-2
To counter these continuing challenges the Circle Trigon Government has conducted annual fall maneuvers in areas just east of the International Border.
These maneuvers were concluded on 1 Septerber; however all participating military units have been retained in maneuver assembly areas.
Negotiations between East and West, over access rights to Berlin, were terminated on 10 September with no settlement.
Since that time the political and military situation has deteriorated rapidly.
Due to these repeated challenges to her sovereignty the Circl.
Trigon Government has decided to initiate an offensive to the weqt using three Army Groups to secure existing border jurisdictions.
Circle Trigon Ministry of Defense has ordered Army Group Nord to attack across the International Border in sector (north) with final objective--control of the Essen, Dusseldorf, Cologne corridor.
Army Group Okcidento to attack in sector (center) with final objectives--secure Kassel, Erfurt, Schweinfurt triangle. Army Group ;olfo to attack across Internation Border (south) with final objective--control of Frankfurt Mainz Corridor.
Mission
Army Group Okcidento attacks across International Border in sector Cretzschwitz (TS9747) to Cheb (UR1251) commencing on order,to secure Kassel (off map), Erfurt (PB4348), Schweinfurt (NA8045), triangle with the 2 Combined Arms Army (2 CAA), 16 Combined Arms Army (16 CAA), 1 Tank Army, on-lin,, with 11 Tank Arm, in reserve.
Execution a. Concept of Operation
(1) Mpieuver (a) 2 CA.A attacks in the north. Penetrates enemy positions in zone to seize 1(assel (off map) Erfurt (1B 4348) Corridor, and protects Army Group ri-ht flank and prepares to continue attack to the west. (1) SASP 218: vicinity Dohna (VS2045)
(2) Sp-cial Ammunition Load can be drawn commencing 141800SEP, and will be completed no later than 142200SEP.
Command and Signal
Army Group Okcidento headquarters is located at Pirna (US2345), opens at 141200SEP. The ultimate goal of the resea-ch is to relate command system display design to information processing, and assimilation, problem solving, and decision making behavior.
We would like you to help in this effort by taking part in some very basic planning activities today.
Since we cannot provide you with a full complement of staff element personnel, an automated data system has been provided as a decision aid. 
2.
Assume that no contingency plans are available. You will be given first instructions by excerpts from a Corps OPORD and from guidance issued by the 20 Mech Div Commander.
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MEEDING PAGE HL-& 3.
In accomplishing your G-3 activities you will need information stored in the computer.
You will be able to obtain this information by yourself by direct request via the CRT. When this briefing is completed your ORT display will be activated. An index to the information stored in the computer will appear on the CRT and simple procedural instructions will appear on the CRT.
Just follow the instructions on each display and the information you need will appear on the CRT.
4.
Messages from various 30 (US) Army organization will be coming in from time-to-time via the high speed typewriter.
These messages will cover a variety of activities.
As you retrieve information from the data base, you may feel there are inadequacies in the content or display of information. We have provided a user comment sheet at the back of the briefing paper. During the course of your planning activities please note any deficiencies or suggestions for improvement that occur to you. Such suggestions and comments have often proved of value in previous research.
For purposes of this study, today's date is 14 September, and it is now 2100 hours. The bulk of Corps nuclear weapons will be allocated to the divisions in the FDA.
Allocations with authority to dispense and expend will be provided if Circle Trigon forces employ nuclear weapons. Units will construct obstazles as reouired to cause maximum restriction to enemy movement.
Roads or other high-speed avenues of approach will be blocked in depth. Barriers will canalize enemy attack into killing area.
(b)
Destruction of Population Centers
Destruction of population centers and communications, transportation, utilities, mining, factories and port facilities will be hld tn a minimum. 
